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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MERIEL M. HACKING,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 16,821

RULON C. HACKING,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
By this action,

plain~iff-respondent,

Meriel M. Hacking,

(hereinafter, "respondent") sought and obtained a divorce from her
husband, defendant-appellant, Rulon C. Hacking, {hereinafter,
"appellant").
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On March 22, 1979 respondent was granted a partial decree of
divorce from appellant, but the issues of permanent alimony and
·Child support, together with the issue of ultimate property distribution, were ·reserved for subsequent trial. · Trial on these
. ·issues was held on April 17, and August 16, 1979, and the lower
court entered its amended judgment, based upon the evidence introduced at trial, on October 10, 1979.

The lower court awarded the

bulk of the marital propert-y equally to the parties as tenants in
common.

Specifically, the lower court ordered that the ranch,

title to most of which was in appellant and his mother's name, be
awarded the parties equally as tenants in common, such ranch to be·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

operated as a partnership and continued under the "immediate
management and direction of the parties' son, Mitchell, in

acco~

dance with usual business practices of an on-going cattle operat:'
(Transcript, hereinafter "Tr.", at 148.

The clerk below failed

11

number the transcript as part of the record; therefore, referenCEI
must be made to both the record (as partially numbered) and the
transcript.)
RELIEF

SOUGH~

ON APPEAL

Appellant see](s a reversal of the lower court's disposition :1
of the parties' marital property and either: (1) remand of the
findin~:1

case with instructions to the trial court to ·enter proper

of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, based upon the evidencE1
adduced at trial; or, ( 2) pursuant to the equitable power of thi

1
,

Court to modify the lower court's findings and conclusions in.
equitable actions, modification of the lower court's final distribution of the marital property to conform with the evidence
adduced below and the applicable equitable. principles.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1948, approximately four years before the parties to thi·
action were married, appellant, Rulon
agreement with his father, Rulon

s.

c.

Hacking entered into an

Hacking.

(Tr. 29.)

The

agreement provided that if appellant would remain upon his fathe·
ranch and help the latter operate and manage the same, the ranch
would become appellant's upon his father's death.

{Tr. 28-29.)

In fact, for appellant's entire life, to and including the present, he has lived on and worked the ranch, which included vario
parcels of real property referred to below as the Diamond Moun~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

1

Wild Mountain, Coal Mine Basin and Allen Place properties, together with various state grazing leases, Bureau of Land Management grazing permits, Dinosaur Park grazing permits and a
membership interest in the Uintah Basin Grazing Association.
(Tr. 33 4. )
In December of 1952, appellant and respondent, Meriel M.
Hacking, were married.

(Tr. 27.)

Respondent was employed spora-

dically during the first few years of the partie.s' marriage, but
no definitive eviden_ce was presented below with respect to the
particulars of that employment, including length of tenure and
remuneration.

Respondent did, however, work in a "government

office" for five years, beginning in 1962.

(Tr. 215)

was presented below with respect to the nature of such

No evidence
employment~

or respondent's compensation therefor.
Appellant worked closely with his father in operating the
ranch during the early years of the parties' marriage, while
concurrently working for the McCullough Company.

(Tr. 29.)

Starting in 1965, appellant as~umed complete operation of the
ranch, (Tr. 30.) which had expanded over the years as a result of
various acquisitions of real property on the part of appellant
and his father.

( Ex • :fl: 3 ;

Tr • 3 3 4 . )

In 1968 appe~lant's father and mother conveyed to him by
warranty deed, approximately one-half of the Diamond Mountain
property, in partial fulfi~lment of their earlier agreement to
convey to appellant th~ entire ranch conditioned upon his lifelong dedication to working and managing the same.

(Ex. #4.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The parties' son, Mitchell, testified that appellant bore the
primary responsibility for managing the ranch from 1965 until
February of 1978, when Mitchell began managing the operation as a
result of the parties' pending divorce and his mother's refusal t
cooperate in its management. {Tr. 155-156; 190-192.)

Mitchell

Hacking willingly acknowledged that, although respondent and the
Hacking children occasionally participated in ranch operations,
and in this limited sense the ranch could be deemed a "family
operation," nevertheless, the primary responsibility for making

"

specific decisions and operating the ranch as a whole, was borne
exclusively by appellant.

(Tr. 197-199.)

Over the course of years of the parties' marriage, appellant
managed the ranch and worked for McCullough for a period of sixteen years.

(Tr. 29.)

In February of 1978 appellant began

working for a company called "Dalgarno."

Appellant's earnings

from his employment with these companies were substantially invested in the ranch.

(Tr •. 34, 189, 332.)

In 1964, appellant,

together with a partner named Merkley, purchased and operated
a fast-food franchise known as the A & W drive-in; the drivein was operated in downtown Vernal, Utah, for a period of six
years exclusively by appellant's partner.

(Tr. 33-34.}

In 1970

appellant purchased his partner's interest; and thereafter, Mrs.
Hacking operated the drive-in.

Although the business was sue-

cessful in earlier years, subsequent competition by other fastfood franchises and d~preciation of the equipment and premises,
coupled with the unwillingness of respondent to continue to
·operate the business, all led the trial court to conclude that t
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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same should be sold and ·the proceeds equally divided.

Appellant

does not dispute the lower court's decision.in this regard.
~ppellant conceded at trial that respondent should be awarded

approximately one-half of the value of the parties' marital property; to this~end, ·appellant proffered a proposed property disfribution schedule which awarded respondent various items of
marital property, approximately equal in value to those items
which appellant proposed to retain.

(Ex. #1)

Appellant's pro-

posal provided that he should be awarded the ranch, and
~

respondent would be awarded the balance of the parties' marital
property, including valuable real property such as the Allen
property and the real property on which the drive-in was
constructed.
It was appellant's position, however, that although respondent was entitled to one-half of· the value of the marital·
prope~ty,

the ranch.

justice and equity required that appellant be awarded
To support appellant's position, substantial evidence

was introduced to establish

th~

following:

(1)

appellant had

been raised from childhood, both living and working on his father's
ranch, and had entered into an agreement with his father which was
subsequently partially fulfilled when appellant received a conveyance of a substantial portion of ranch acreage (see above);
(2)

respondent, although an occasional participant in ranch

operations, did not bear nor assume the principal responsibilities
of managing and operating the ranch (see above);

(3)

because of

the type of physical labor involved in ranch operations and
management, and because of respondent's self-admitted heal th
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problems, ~espondent presently is and will continue to be physically incapable of effectively and prosperously managing the
ranch (Tr. 193, 265, 339.);

( 4) appellant will continue to be thE

most capable, as between the two parties, of operating the ranch
(Tr. 339.); and (5)

finally, although condededly the Allen pro-

perty could be divided and separated from the rest of the ranch
without egregiously interfering with orderly ranch operations,
(Tr. 187) no other part of the "whole operation". couid be
economicaily severed without rendering unprofitable the ranch
as a whole. (Tr. 334.)
Notwithstanding such substantial evidence, the trial court,
contrary to Solomon's example, divided the child exactly in half
and awarded the parties a tenancy in common interest in all ranct
properties.

( R; 135-150.)

Moreover, the trial court imposed

an involuntary partnership on the

partie~

with respect to the

ranching operation, and the duty, upon a non-party to the divorce
action·, Mitchell Hacking, to operate the ranch and resolve disput
between appellant and respondent.
No evidence was presented at trial to justify

th~

impositior

of an involuntary partnership upon the parties, nor to sanction
the imposition of a duty upon Mitchell Hacking to referee the
bitter disputes of the parties with respect to ranch management.
Although Mitchell Hacking testified that in the abstract, ci
separate identity and owne~ship of cattle could be maintained in

..

the event the parties were to continue to operate the ranch to· gether after the divorce, {Tr. 186) nevertheless, no evidence
was_ presented to suggest the parties would be able to continue~
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run the ranch together, even under Mitchell Backing's benevolent
stewardship, under the facts and circumstances.of this case.

To

the contrary, Mitchell Backing's testimony is illuminating:
Q.
Would there be any problem of operating
them [two separate cattle herds} together
after they are separated and identified?
A.
The cows, you mean?
Q.
Yes.
As a herd?
A.
No, not if I understand the question
right.
Q.
Well, you would be able to continue
to operate the herd, and you would be
willing to operate both your mother's
as well as your father's cattle, wouldn't
you?
A.
Correct.
If they could get along.
(Tr. 186-187.)

(Emphasis added.)

If his parents could get along, Mitchell Hacking would be
willing. to operate the ranch and the individual cattle enterprises
of the parties.

But he knew the parties could not get along, and

he testified that disputes had arisen since he had taken command
of the operation.

(Tr. 192.)

Unsure of himself arid his testi-

mony, and doubtless despondent with respect to his uncomfortable
position in the cross-fire between his parents'
Hacking testified near the end of his testimony:

bitterness, Mitchell
"I just don't

know how they will feel about me·when this is over."

(Tr. 198.)

(The trial court's amended findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and judgment are set forth ~n Appendix "A", infra.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT'S IMPOSITION OF AN INVOLUNTARY PARTNERSHIP
ON APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT WITH RESPECT TO OPERATION OF THE
RANCH, CONSTITUTED A TOTAL ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
In DeRose y. DeRose, 19 Utah2d 77 426 P.2d 221 (1967), this

Court Sponsored
observed:
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

[w]e remain cognizant of the pierogatives of the trial
court and the latitude of discretion it is properly allowed
in divorce cases.
But this discretion is not without limit
nor immune from correction on review, if that is warranted.
Due to the seriousness of $UCh proceedings and the vital
effect they have on people•s lives, it is also.the iesponsibility of this court to carefully survey what is done,
and while. the determinations of the trial court are given
deference and not disturbed lightly, changes should be
made if that seems essential to the accomplishment of the
desired objectives of the decree: that is, to make such
an arrangement of the proper~y and economic reso~rces of
the parties that they will have th~ best possible opportunity to reconstruc~ their lives on a happy and useful
basis fo.r themselves an.a their children.
An important
considerat:io.·n in this rE~gard 1s the el1m1nat1on or minimizing of poten~ial frictions or difficulties in the
future.
[Footnotes omitted.1
Id., 426 P.2d at 222. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, one of the most important objectives established
by this Court to guide trial courts in property disposition in
divorce proceedings, is to so dispose of the marital property so
·as to enhance the opportunity on the part of the parties to reco1
struct their lives on a happy and useful basis for themselves anc
their children.

Part and parcel of this objective is

the·respo~

sibility of the trial court to.anticipate and eliminate or minim:
potential frictions or difficulties in the future dealings of
parties.

t~

This position has been frequently reiterated by this

Court.
In Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978), rehearing
denied, Jan. 18, 1979, this Court observed:
[t]he responsibility of the trial court is to endeavor
to provide a just and, equitable adjustment of their
[the parties to a divorce] economic resources so that
the parties might reconstru6t their lives on a happy
and usef.u~ basis.
[Footnoted oini tted.]
Id., at 148. (Emphasis added.)

See also, Searle v. Searle, 522

P.2d 697, 700 {Utah 1974).
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In Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979), this Court noted
as follows:
[~]hen a marr~age has failed, a court's duty is to consider the various factors relating to the situation and
to arrange the best allocation of the property and the
economi~ res?urces of the parties.so that the parties
and their children can pursue their lives in as happy .
and use~ul man~er as poss~ble.
If it appears that the
decree is so discordant with an equitable allocation
that i t will more likely lead to further difficulties
and distress than to serve the desired objective, then
a reappraisal of the decree must be undertaken.
In view
of these principles, it is our view that the property
award in this case is far too disparate and that the
decree must b~ modified.

Id., at 872.

(Emphasis added.)

Clearly, one of the primary objectives of which the trial
court should never lose sight, is to provide for an equitable
and just distribution of property in such a manner so as to
facilitate the happy and successful reordering of the lives of
the parties and their children and to minimize potential future
friction, discord, and dispute.

In the present case, the trial

court's amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, reflect

a

total abandonment of these objecti_ves by. the lower

court.in disposing of the parties' marital property.
It is difficult to conceive of a situation, other than marriage, wherein two individuals would be required to work more
closely than in the context of a business partnership.

It is

fundamental hornbook law that general partners have broad powers
to bind each other by their individual acts, and have a fundamental right to actively participate in the management and operation of the partnership.

The implication from such broad powers

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and rights is that partners must be able to continually cooperab
and comprom,ise in the day-to-day operations qf the partnership.
Conciliation, not confrontation, must be the partners fundamenta:
creed.

As noted above, no evidence was introduced in the lower

court to suggest that these parties could continue to operate thi
ranch on a partnership basis.

To the contrary, substantial evi-

dence was introduced below with respect. to significant conflicts
which developed during the joint operation of the ranch pending
~

the· final divorce decree.

Mitchell Hacking testified at trial

that his father and mother had not been able to agree on such
fundamental aspects of the ranching operation as the amount of
money required to be borrowed from the Production Credit Associa·
tion to finance annual expenses in the operation of the ranch.
Finally, evidence was presented below, as noted above·, and was
uncontradicted to the effect that the operation of the ranch wou:
be rendered difficult, if not impossible, because of the parties'
evident inability to compromise and work together.

The trial

court's decision:, therefore, to impose an involuntary. partnershiJ
upon the parties with respect to the ranching operation, constituted a total abuse of discretion.

No evidence justified the

decision, and substantial evidence to the contrary compels the
conclusion that the partnership arrangement envisioned by the
lower court would be fraught with friction and continual future
discord.

Under such sircumstances, the lower courts' decision t

impose such a partnership should be reversed.
Based upon this conclusion, this Court has two options.
recently noted in Read v. Read, 594 P. 2d 871 (Utah 1979):
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A~

[~}ecause th~ ca~e is equitab~e ~n nature,

this court may·
exercise its own prerogative of making a modification
in the decree, or remand for entry of a modified decree by
the trial court.
[Footnote omitted.}

~ither

Id., at 8 7 3.
In Read, a significant number of inconsistencies and am bigui ties existed upon the face of the record before the Supreme·
Court.

Consequently, the Court was compelled, under those circum-

stances, to remand the case with instructions to the trial court
~

to enter clear, concise, and consistent findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

In the present case, this Court is not faced

with the overwhelming ambiguities and consistencies present in
Re~d.

The record is quite cl ear.

This Court_, therefore, in the

interest of judicial economy and expediency, should exercise its
discretion to equitably modify the lower court's amended findings,
conclusions, and judgment.

Appellant's position is that an equitable

modification of the decree, consistent with the evidence adduced
below, should include modification of the lower court's order with
respect to the imposition of an involuntary partnership upon the
parties.

Such involuntary partnership, together with the imposi-

tion of duties of management and dispute resolution upon a nonparty to the divorce action, Mitchell Hacking~ constituted an
abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court, and, therefore, should be stricken.

This court should then equitably divide

the property between tpe parties, according to the evidence introduced below.

As noted above, such division would equitably in-

clude awarding appellant the ranch outright.
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POINT II
THE LOWER COURT'S FAILURE TO AWARD APPELLANT THE RANCH PROPERTIES WAS INEQUTTAB~E AND UNJUST AND, THEREFORE, CONSTITUTED
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
It is appellant's position that not only was the lower cour
imposition of an involuntary partnership on the parties an abuse
of discretion,

but the lower court's ultimate division of the

property into equal tenancy-in-common

interest~

also constituted

an abuse of discretion.
t

It is axiomatic· that the trial court is vested with broad
discretion with respect to property settlement in divorce proceedings.

As this Court has often stated:

[t]he trial court, in a divorce action, has considerable
latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and property
interests.
A party appealing therefrom has the purden
to prove there was a misunderstanding or misapplication
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error;
or the evidence clearly preponderated against the finding;
or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion.
[Footnote omitted.]
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). See also
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980); Mccrary v. McCrar
599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979); Pope v. Poee, 589 P.2d 752, 753
(Utah 1978); Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah 1977);
Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977·}; Baker v.
Baker, 551 P. 2d 1263 (Utah 1976); Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d
491, 492-493 (Utah 1975); and Mi~chell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d
1359, 1360 (Utah 1974).
Al though the trial court is vested with broad discretion w:
respect to property distribution in a divorce proceeding, the
guiding principles of justice and equity should control the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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court's proper exercise of such discretion.
562 P. 2d 235, 237 (Utah 1977).

Hamilt9n v. Hamilton,

Al though appellant· concedes· that

the trial court is generally vested with broad discretion with
·respect to property distribution and divorce proceedings, nevertheless, such discretion is not without limit, and cannot be·
exercised, except when supported by substantial evidence at trial.

In DeRose v. DeRose, 19 Utah2d 77, 426 P.2d 221 (1967} this Court
stated, after acknowledging the generally broad discretion of the
trial court to dispose of marital property:
[b)ut this discretion is. not without limit, nor immune
from correction on review, if that is warranted. Due
to the seriousness of such proceedings and the vital
effect they have on people's lives, it is also the
responsibility of this court to carefully survey what
is done, and while the determinations of the trial
court are given deference and not disturbed lightly,
changes should be made.if that seems essential to the
accomplishment of the desired ob]ectives of the
decree • • • •
[Footnotes omitted.]

Id., 426 P.2d at 222. (Emphasis added.)
This Court recently outlined the burden which an appellant
must bear to warrant reversal in this kind of :Proceeding:·
[i)n ·these matters, a party seeking a reversal of the
trial court must prove a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudical
error, or ·that the evidence clearly preponderated aga~nst
the findings, or that su6h a serious inequity resu~ted
from the order as to constitute an abuse of the trial
court's discretion. [Footnotes omitted.]
Mccrary v. Mccrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979). (Emphasis
added.)

See also, Kerr v. Ke~r, 610 P. 2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980);

and English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977).
Mindful of the burden appellant, therefore, bears on this
appeal, appellant reiter~tes his claim that the lower court
abused its discretion in two particulars, according to the stanSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dard announced in Mccrary: (1) the evidence clearly preponderate(
against the lower court 1 s findings and conclusions with respect
division of the marital property into equal tenancy-in-common
interests; and (2) serious inequity would result were appellant
not awarded the ranch, upon which he had lived and worked since
childhood.
The lower court specifically found, in Finding of Fact #9
and concluded as a matter of law, in Conclusion of Law. #S(c), the:
the real property o.f the parties, including the ranching operatic
here in issue, should be awarded to the parties equally as tenant
in common.

The court did not recite specific. findings of fact

which justified its general conclusion that the parties should
share equally, as tenants in common, in the ranching operation.
The lower court did not specifically find that the proposed distribution of the marital property proffered by appellant would bE
inequitable or unjust.
j~stified

No

other supporting findings or conclusic

the trial court's Finding of Fact 19, and conclusion

of law #5(c).

(See R. 135-150, and Appendix A.)

Substantial evidence was presented below to demonstrate
appellant's long-standing affiliation with the ranch and
operation.

it~

Appellant had spent a significant portion of his lifi

prior to his marriage, living on and working his father's ranch.
Appellant had entered into an agreement from an early age with h
father, respecting the ranch.

The agreement provided that if

appellant would remain" on the ranch and diligently work by his
father's side, ultimately, appellant would own the entire operation.

Appellant married respondent long after he had already
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established hls int~ntion to r~mai6 on his father's ranch.

After

his marriage to respondent, appellant continued to.work and supervise operation~ on the ranch.

Although respondent ocqasionally

participated in ranch operations·, she did not assume the principal
responsibility of managing and operating the same.
Long before his father's death, appellant took over the
principal responsibility of managing the ranch on a day to day
basis.

Appellant bore the burden of making the ranching operation

profitable.

The ranching operation involves the kind of physical

labor appellant has exerted his entire life and respondent is
incapable of accomplishing because of her health.

Respondent's

participation in the operation of the ranch has not been on the
same level as appellant's, and respondent could not testify that
she possessed the requisite experience to properly manage the
ranching operation.

Finally, the entire ranching operation should

not be divided because of the integral nature. of each of its
functional components.
tion unprofitable.

To do so, would render the entire. opera-

Thus, the ranch should be awarded exclusiyely ·

to one party, and it would be unsound and inequitable to award
it to respondent.
Because of appellant's long standing affiliation with and
ownership of the ranching operation, because of his experience
over the years in managing and operating the same, because respondent is incapable of performing the labor required to successfully
manage and operate th~ ranch, and because significant, unrefuted
testimony was introd~ced that the ranching operation could not be
profitably divided equally between the parties, the lower court
abused its discretion in awarding the parties an equal tenancy in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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common interest in the same.

Substantial evidence wa.s introduce

below with respect to an equitable distribution of.the property
which would have allowed appellant to retain ownership and to
continue to manage the ranching operations.

Under these

circ~~

stances, the trial court's findings and conclusions rise to the
level of an abuse of discretion.

This Court may, in its discre-

tion, modify the decree to conform with the evidence above recib
and appellant respectfully requests the Court to so modify the
decree.

In the aleernative, the trial court's findings, conclu-

sions and judgment, with respect to disposition of the ranch
property, should be reversed, and the case should be remanded to
the lower court for entry of findings and conclusions consistent
with the evidence originally adduced.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, because the trial court's
order imposing an involuntary partnership upon the parties
was a clear abuse of discretion, and because the lower court's
award of the ranching operations to the parties equally as
tenants in common constituted a further abuse of discretion,
this Court should either modify the lower court's decree, consistent with the evidence referred to above, or, in the alternative, should reverse the cause and remand for further proceedi
in the lower court.

,'~CKSON HOWAD;for:
LEWIS & PETERSEN

L/,1~WARD,

120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for.Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
MAILED 2 copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Authur
H. Nielsen, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, 410 Newhouse
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 23rd day of July, 1980.
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Arthur H. Nielsen
Joseph L. Henriod
EarL Jay Peck
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
400 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:

FILED
DiSTRICT COURT
Ul~~r,~:-1 COUNTY. UTAH

OCT 1O_1979
'dY _ _ _ _ _ _ _ DEPUT'<

521-3350

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
MERIEL M. HACKING,
AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
v .

. RULON C. HACKING,

Civil No. 9497

Defendant.

This matter came on regularly before the Court for hearing
in Provo on the 22nd day of March in.Vernal, on the 17th day of
April and continued hearing in Provo on the 16th day of August,
1979.

Arthur H. Nielsen appeared as attorney for the Plaintiff

and Jackson B. Howard appeared as attorney for the Defendant.
At the hearing on March 22, 1979,

the Court granted Plaintiff

a divorce and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
a Decree.

The trial of the issues with respect to final alimony,

support money and an equitable distribution of the property and
assets of the parties was held in Vernal on April 17, 1979, and
in Provo on August 16, 1979.

Following the presentation of

evidence and after oral argument from the attorneys for the
respective parties, the matter was taken under advisement by
the Court on August 16, 1979.

The Court now having reviewed

and considered the evidence, being fully advised in the premises,
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
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together in acquiring various assets which have been developed
as a family enterprise consisting of a drive-in restaurant
located in the City of Vernal and a farm, ranch and livestock
operation.
2.

Following the separation of the parties which led to

the filing of these proceedings, the DefcncL:in t 11.:i.s en t~rcd in to
and developed a business with pis son, known as the Ouray Brine
Company.

Although the evidence shows that the legal title to

this business appears to belong to the son, Mitchell, an exchange
of jobs between the Defendant and Mitchell appears to be for
convenience and appearances only and does not reflect the true,
equitable ownership of the business.
3.

However, in view of the fact that this business was

developed at a time when the parties were estranged, the Court
finds that any value in such business should be awarded separately
to the Defendant.
4.

The Court finds that each party is entitled to have and

retain the personal items and effects now in his or her possession.
The Court further finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to have
and retain the household items, including utensils, cooking ware,
silver, linens and all furnishings, furniture and appliances in
the home, and the 1976 Ford LTD automobile now in her possession;
and the Defendant is entitled to have and retain the 1978 Pontiac
automobile now in his possession, each subject to any outstanding
debt, lien or obligation owing thereon.
5.

It appearing from the evidence that the GMC truck

recently purchased by the Defendant has been and is used as a
part of the Ouray Brine Company operation, the Court finds that
said vehicle should not be included in a division of the assets
of the parties; provided, however, that the funds used from the
sale of livestock of the ranching operation or any other funds
from the joint assets of the parties used toward the purchase
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- ""'-'--" · the Defendant.

6.

Except as herein otherwise specifically provided, each

party is entitled to an equal share in all of the assets acquired
by the parties during the marriage.
7.

With respect to the drive-in restaurant business located

in Vernal (appraised by Mr. Gerber at $173,180.00), it appears
that Defendant is not interested in its operation and therefore
the Court directs that the same be sold to such buyer as the
parties may agree.

In the event a sale has not been effected

by the parties within 60 days from the date of the entry of the
Court's Judgment herein, then either party may seek partition
as provided by law.

Pending such sale or partition, Plaintiff

may -remain in possession of the drive-in and operate the same,
receiving and retaining all income derived therefrom; provided,
she shall pay all expenses of operation, other than real property
taxes.
8.

With respect to the Maeser residente (appraised by Mr.

Gerber for the sum of $44,000.00), Defendant is given the option
to buy said property by paying to the Plaintiff the sum of
$22,000.00 within 30 days from the date of the entry of Judgment
herein.

If Defendant fails to exercise said option, then said

property shall be sold as in the case of the drive-in restaurant
and the proceeds thereof divided equally between the parties.
Pending such ~cquisition or sale, Plaintiff may, if she desires,
continue to reside in the home and have the exclusive possession
thereof, subject to the payment by her of monthly utility bills.
9.

All of the rest of the real property of the parties,

including grazing permits, and all livestock and farm and ranch
machinery, including the 1976 Ford truck, and other personal
property comprising the farm and livestock operation are hereby
awarded to the parti'es equally as tenants in common.

The Court

further directs that the farm and livestock operation be continued
under the immediate management and direction of the parties' son,
Mitchell,
in accordance
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on-going cattle operation.

Any management decisions such as

borrowing money or purchasing arid selling livestock or equipment
shall be decided by the joint vote of the parties hereto; provided,
however, that in the event of a dispute between the parties, their
son, Mitchell, shall have a vote; and a majority vote will be
required for any decisions not agreed to by both I'laintif f .:.rnd
Defendant.
10.

The property referred to in the preceding paragraph

includes, but is not limited to, the one-half interest of the
parties in the real property located on Diamond Mountain, the
Wild Mountain property, the Allen· property in Maeser, the Coal
Mine Basin property, the lease from the State of Utah, all BLM
permits, Dinosaur Park permits and the interest in the Uintah
Basin Grazing Association as described in Schedule A attached
to these Findings and by reference incorporated herein.
11.

The parties are and shall ·be liable for (and the

properties described in the preced{ng paragraph are subject to)
the outstanding liens, mortgages and operating debts and
obligations incurred mutually by both parties.
12.

Unless otherwise agreed to by both parties, the practice

of growing feed on the farm to be used in the operation of the
cattle shall continue and such feed shall not be separately sold.
13.

In the event it becomes impracticable to proceed with

a joint operation of the ranch as hereinabove set forth and the
parties are unable to work out between themselves a partition
of the property hereinabove described and awarded to them as
tenants in common, then either or both may petition the Court
for a division of such property in accordance with the procedures
for partition outlined in Chapter 39 of the Utah Code Annotated,
1953.
14.

Each party is awarded an undivided one-half interest

in the stock of the Intermediate·Credit Bank and the stock of
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Hiko Be11Library
andServices
Dinah
Bowl.
and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15.

The Court also finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to

and Defendant should continue to pay to the Plaintiff in
accordance with the Temporary Order heretofore entered herein
the sum of $500.00 per month alimony and support money to and
including the month of

~16 fl/\ , 1981).~aid

award is a

continuation of the award of temporary alimony and support money
heretofore entered herein and is payable the 1st day of each
month.

Except for such continuing alimony and support money,

said Temporary Order is hereby superseded and vacated.
16.

The Court further finds that the minor child of the

parties, Sonya, is suffering from chronic sugar diabetes and in
need of constant and continuing medical care, treatment and
attention, as well as personal attention and supervision by the
Plaintiff.

In view of such circumstances, the Court finds that

Defendant should continue to pay to Plaintiff as and for support
money for said minor child the sum of $250.00 per month, payable
on the 1st day of each month, until such child reaches the age
of 21 years, unless otherwise ordered by this Court.
17.

The Court further finds that each party should pay his

or her own costs and attorney fees and all debts and obligations
·incurred separately by him or her since the separation of the
parties.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes
as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Except as herein otherwise specifically provided, all

of the assets accumulated by the parties up to the time of their
separation should be divided equally between them, subject only
to the payment of the outstanding debts and obligations which the
parties have mutually incurred.
2.

The Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate

property all of her personal effects, all household items,
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furnishings and appliances, now in her possession and the 1976
Ford LTD automobile, subject to· the payment of any outstanding
indebtedness owing thereon.
3.

Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate

property his personal effects and possessions now in his
possession and the 1978 Pontiac .J.utomobile no\v in his posscs:..;ion,
subject to the payment of any outstanding indebtedness owing
thereon.
4.

Defendant should further be awarded as his sole and

separate property the interest which he has in the Ouray Drine
Company, including the GMC truck which was purchased by Defendant;
provided, however, that all -sums used for the purchase of said
truck from the ranching operation, including proceeds from the
sale of any livestock, shall be returned to the ranching operation,
to be accounted for and divided equally between the parties.
5.

The Judgment should further provide that:
(a)

With respect to the drive-in restaurant business

located in Vernal (appraised by Mr. Gerber at $173,180.00), the
same be sold to such buyer as the parties may agree.

In the

event a sale has not been effected by the parties within 60 days
from the date of the entry of the Court's Judgment herein, then
either party may seek partition as provided by law.

Fending

such sale or partition, Plaintiff may remain in possession of
the drive-in and operate the same, receiving and retaining all
income derived therefrom; provided, she shall pay all expenses
of operation, other than real property taxes.
(b)

With respect to the Maeser residence (appraised

by Mr. Gerber for the sum of $44,000.00), Defendant be given the
option to buy said property by paying to the Plaintiff the sum
of $22,000.00 within 30 days from the date of the entry of
Judgment herein.

If Defendant fails to exercise said option,

then said property shall be sold ·as in the case of the dri~e-in
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partfes.

Pending such acquis.l.tion or sale, Plaintiff may, if

she desires, continue to reside· in the home and have the exclusive
possession thereof, subject to the payment by her of monthly
utility bills.
(c)

All of the rest of the real property of the parties,

including grazing permits, and all livestock and farm and ranch
machinery, including the 1976 Ford truck, and other personal
property comprising the farm and livestock operation be awarded
to the parties equally as tenants in common.

The farm and

livestock operation shall be continued under the immediate
management and direction of the parties' son, Mitchell, in
accordance with usual business practices of an on-going cattle
operation.

Any management decisions such as borrowing money or

purchasing and selling livestock or equipment shall be decided
by the joint vote of the parties hereto; provided, however, that
in the event of a dispute between the parties, their son, Mitchell,
shall have a vote; and a majority vote will be required for any
decisions not agreed to by both Plaintiff and Defendant.
(d)

The property referred to in the preceding paragraph

includes, but is not limited to, the one-half interest of the
parties in the real property located on Diamond Mountain, the
Wild Mountain property, the Allen property

in

Maeser, the Coal

Mine Basin property, the lease from the State of Utah, all BLM
permits, Dinosaur Park permits and the interest in the Uintah
Basin Grazing Association as described in Schedule A attached
to the Findings and by reference incorporated herein.
(e)

The parties are and shall be liable for (and the

properties described in the preceding paragraph are subject to)
the outstanding liens, mortgages and operating debts and
obligations incurred mutually by both parties.
(f)

Unless otherwise agreed to by both parties, the

practice of growing feed on the farm to be used in the operation
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(g)

In the event it becomes impracticable to proceed

with a joint operation of the ranch as hereinabove set forth and
the parties are unable to work out between themselves a partition
of the property hereinabove described and awarded to them as
tenants in common, then either or both may petition the Court
for a division of such property in accordance with the procedures
for partition outlined in Chapter 39 of the Utah Code Annotated,
1953.
6.

Each party should be awarded one-half of the stock of

the Intermediate Credit Bank and the stock of Hilo Bell and
Dinah Bowl.
7.

Plaintiff should be awarded and Defendant should be

required to continue to pay to the Plaintiff, in accordance with
the Temporary Order heretofore entered herein, the sum of
$500.00 per month alimony and support money to and including the
month of

/Jle,

0 AfH

_R4, 198CI).

This award is a continuation of the

award of temporary alimony and support money heretofore entered
herein and is payable the 1st day of each month.

Except for

such continuing alimony and support money, said Temporary Order
should be superseded and vacated.
8.

Plaintiff should be awarded and Defendant should be

required to continue to pay to Plaintiff, following the
termination of alimony set forth in the preceding paragraph, as
and for support money for said minor child the sum of $250.00
per month, payable on the 1st day of each month, until such
child reaches the age of 21 years, unless otherwise ordered by·
this Court.
9.

Each party should pay his or her own costs and attorney

fees and all debts and obligations incurred separately by him
or her since the separation of the parties.
DATED this

/C>~ay

of

rr;;;;p~,

1979.

~<4~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVED the foregoing proposed Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, together with the proposed Amended Judgment
to be entered thereon, by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid,
to Jackson Howard, Howard, Lewis and Petersen, Attorneys for
Defendant, at their office address, 120 East 300 North, Provo,
Utah 84601, this

~

day of

19794
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SCHEDULE A
Diamond Mountain
An undivided one-half (1/2) interest in the following
described tracts of land in Uintah County, State of Utah, to-wit:
TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 23 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN
Section 2: South half of Southwest quarter.
Section 3: South half of Southeast quarter.
Section 10: Northeast quarter of Southwest quarter; North half
of Southeast quarter; East half of Northwest
quarter; Northeast quarter.
Section 11: North half.
··section 12: West half of Northwest quarter.
TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 23 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN
Section 22: South half of the Southeast quarter.
Section 23: Southeast quarter of Southeast quarter.
Southwest quarter of Southwest quarter.
Section 24: South half of South half.
Section 25: North half of North half.
Section 26: Northeast quarter of Northeast quarter.
Lots 3 and 4; West half of the Northeast quarter;
the Northwest quarter; the North half of the
Southwest quartero
Section 27: Lots 1, 2, and 3; Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter; Northeast quarter of the Southwest
quarter.
Section 34: The North half of the Northeast quarter; also
beginning at the.East quarter corner of said
Section 34; thence North 68°30 1 • west 2837.5 feet
to the quarter Section line; thence North 280
feet more or less to the Northwest corner of the
Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of
said Section 34; thence East 160 rods; thence
South 80 rods to the point of beginning.
Section 35: The North half of the Northwest quarter; Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter; also
beginning at the Northeast corner of the Southeast
quarter of the Northwest quarter of said Section
35 and running thence South 45° West 1866.7 feet
to the Southwest corner of the Southeast quarter
of the Northwest quarter of said Section 35; thence
North 1320 feet; thence East 1320 feet to point
of beginning.
TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 24 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN
Section 19: Lots 3 and 4; East half of Southwest quarter; Southwest quarter of Northeast quarter.
Section 30: Lot 1.
together with all water rights, grazing rights, winter and summer
graz.ing rights and improvements and appurtenances and rights of
way thereunto belonging.
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- 2 Coal Mine Basin
The following described real property (surface rights
only) located in Uintah County, State of Utah:
Lot 10 and West 1/2 South West 1/4 of Section 2, Township 4
South, Range 20 East of Salt Lake Meridian.
Allen Property
The following described property located in Uintah
County, State of Utah:
Beginning 53.5 rds. North of South East corner Section 18,
Township 4 South, Range 21 East Salt Lake Meridian thence
West 31 rds. North 61.5 rds. East 31.68 feet South 2752 rds.
East 29.08 rds. South 33.98 rds. to beginning.
Beginning 53.5 rds. North and 31 rds. West of South East
corner Section 18, Township 4 South, Range 21 East of Salt
Lake Meridian; thence West 16 rds. North 10°18' West 276.71
feet; thence West 827 ft.; South 28°20' West 172.6 ft.; South
48°05' West 363 ft. South 61°27' West 236.4 ft. thence
North 87°38' West 429.6 ft. thence North 1233.4 ft. thence
East 129 rds. South 61.5 rds. to beginning.
Wild Mountain
The following described real property located in
Moffat County, State of Colorado:
South 1/2 South East 1/4 Section 7; North West 1/4 North West
1/4 Section 17 Township 7 North Range 103 West.
State Grazing Lease
Grazing lease on the following described lands located
in Uintah County, State of Utah:
SWl/4 Section 36, Township 3 South, Range 20 East; NEl/4
NE1/4SE1/4 Section 16, Township 4 South, Range 20 East; Lot
1 NE1/4NW1/4, Lots 3, 4 SE1/4SW1/4 Section 7, Township 4
South, Range 21 East; Lots 3, 4; SW1/4NW1/4, Wl/4SW1/4 Section 13; All Section 14; All Section 15; Wl/2, Nl/2NE1/4,
Sl/2SE1/4 Section 23; Nl/2NW1/4, Wl/2NE1/4, SW1/4SW1/4,
NW1/4SE1/4 I Section 24; Nl/2Nl/2' Sl/2NW1/4, SW1/2NE1/4, NW1/4SW1/4
Section 26; All Section 27, All Section 22; NW1/4NE1/4,
El/2NW1/4, Section 34, in Township 4 South, Range 20 East,
Salt Lake Meridian.
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Arthur H. Nielsen
Joseph L. Henriod
Earl Jay Peck
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
MERIEL M. HACKING,
AMENDED
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 9497
RULON C. HACKING,
Defendant.

This matter came on regularly before the Court for hearing
in Provo on the 22nd day of March in Vernal, on the 17th day of
April and continued hearing in Provo on the 16th day of August,
1979.

Arthur H. Nielsen appeared as attorney for the Plaintiff

and Jackson B. Howard appeared as attorney for the Defendant.
At the hearing on March 22, 1979, the Court granted Plaintiff
a divorce and entered findings of Fae~,

a Decree.

Conclusions of Law and

The trial of the issues with respect to final alimony,

support money and an equitable distribution of the property and
assets of the parties was held in Vernal on April 17, 1979, and
in Provo on August 16, 1979.

Following the presentation of

evidence ~nd after oral argument from the attorneys for the
respective parties, the matter was taken under advisement by
the Court on August 16, 1979.

The Court now having reviewed

and considered the evidence, being fully advised in the premises,
and having made and entered further Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
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by the parties up to the time of their

separation be and they are hereby divided equally between
Plaintiff and Defendant, subject only to the payment of the
outstanding debts and obligations which the parties have mutually
incurred in respect thereto.
2.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her sole and

separate property all of her personal effects, u.11 household
items, including utensils, cook ware, silver, linens, furniture,
furnishings and appliances, now in her possession and the 1976
Ford LTD automobile, subject to the payment of any outstanding
indebtedness owing thereon.
3.

Defendant be and he is hereby awarded as his sole and

separate property his personal effects and possessions now in
his possession and the 1978 Pontiac automobile now in his
possession, subject to the payment of any outstanding indebtedness owing thereon.
4.

Defendant is further awarded as his sole and separate

property the interest which he has in the Ouray Brine Company,
including the GMC truck which was purchased by Defendant; provided,
however, that all sums used for the purchase of said truck from
the ranching operation, including proceeds from the sale of any
livestock, be returned to the ranchin~ operation, to be accoun~ed
for and divided equally between the parties.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
5.

With respect to the drive-in restaurant business located

in Vernal (appraised by Mr. Gerber at $173,180.00), the same be
sold to such buyer as the parties may agree.

In the event a

sale has not been effected by the parties within 60 days from
the date of the entry of the Court's Judgment herein, then either
party may seek partition as provided by law.

Pending such sale

or partition, Plaintiff may remain in possession of the drive-in
and operate the same, receiving and retaining all income derived
therefrom; provided, she shall pay all expenses of operation,
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6.

With respect to the Maeser residence (appraised by Mr.

Gerber for the sum of $44,000.00), Defendant is hereby given the
option to buy said property by paying to the Plaintiff the sum
of $22,000.00 within 30 days from the date of the entry of Judgment
herein.

If Defendant fails to exercise said option, then said

property shall be sold as in the case of the drive-in restuurant
and the proceeds thereof divided equally between the parties.
Pending such acquisition or sale, Plaintiff may, if she desires,
continue to reside in the home and have the exclusive possession
thereof, subject to the payment by her of monthly utility bills.
7.

All of the rest of the real property of the parties,

including grazing permits, and all livestock and farm and ranch
machinery, including the 1976 Ford truck, and other personal
property comprising the farm and livestock operation be and they
are hereby awarded to the parties equally as tenants in common.
The farm and livestock operation shall be continued under the
immediate management and direction of the parties' son, Mitchell,
in accordance with usual business practices of an on-going cattle
operation.

Any management decisions such as borrowing money or

purchasing and selling livestock or equipment shall be decided
by the joint vote of the parties hereto; provided, however, that
in the event of a dispute between the parties, their son, Mitchell,
shall have a vote; and a majority vote will be required for any
decisions not agreed to by both Plaintiff and Defendant.
8.

The property referred to in the preceding paragraph

includes, but is not limited to, the one-half interest of the
parties in the real property located on Diamond Mountain, the
Wild Mountain property, the Allen property in Maeser, the Coal
Mine Basin property, the lease from the State of Utah, all BLM
permits, Dinosaur Park permits and the interest in the Uintah
Basin Grazing Association as described in Schedule A attached
hereto and by reference incorporated herein.
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the outstanding liens, mortgages and operating debts and
obligations incurred mutually by both parties.
10.

Unless otherwise agreed to by both parties, the

practice of growing feed on the farm to be used in the operation
of the cattle shall continue and such feed shall not be separately
sold.
11.

In the event it becomes impracticable to proceed with

a joint operation of the ranch as hereinabove set forth and the
parties are unable to work out between themselves a partition of
the property hereinabove described and awarded to them as tenants
in common, theri either or both may petition the Court for a
division of such property in accordance with the procedures for
partition outlined in Chapter 39 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
12.

Each party is hereby awarded one-half of the stock of

the Intermediate.Credit Bank and the stock of Hike Bell and Dinah
Bowl.
13.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded and Defendant

be and he is hereby required to continue to pay to the Plaintiff,
in accordance with the Temporary Order heretofore entered herein,

the sum of $500.00 per month alimony and
including the month of lg,<o-14,(AL"..' 198D,

~rt

money to and

This award is a

continuation of the award of temporary alimony and support money
heretofore entered herein and is payable the 1st day of each
month.

Except for such continuing alimony and support money,

said Temporary Order is hereby superseded and vacated.
14.

Following the termination of alimony as set forth in

the preceding paragraph, P.laintiff be and she is hereby awarded
and Defendant be and he is hereby required to continue to pay to
Plaintiff as and for support money for said minor child the sum
of $250.00 per month, payable on the 1st day of each month, until
such child

reach~s

the age of 21 years, unless otherwise ordered

by this Court.
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ef'

DATED this .JQ_ day of

@t!l};;po.A ,

19 79.

~'/F LafJUDGE
)trrsTRICT
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SCHEDULE A
Diamond Mountain
An undivided one-half {1/2) interest in the followin~
described tracts of land in Uintah County, State of Utah, to-wit:
TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 23 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN
Section 2: South half of Southwest quarter.
Section 3: South half of Southeast quarter.
Section 10: Northeast quarter of Southwest quarter; North half
of Southeast quarter; East half of Northwest
quarter; Northeast quarter. ·
Section 11: North half.
Section 12: West half of Northwest quarter.
TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 23 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN
Section 22: South half of the Southeast quarter.
Section 23: Southeast quarter of Southeast quarter.
Southwest quarter of Southwest quarter.
Section 24: South half of South half.
Section 25: North half of North half.
Section 26: Northeast quarter of Northeast quarter.
Lots 3 and 4; West half of the Northeast quarter;
the Northwest quarter; the North half of the
Southwest quarter.
Section 27: Lots 1, 2, and 3; Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter; Northeast quarter of the Southwest
quarter.
Section 34: The North half of the Northeast quarter; also
beginning at the East quarter corner of said
Section 34; thence North 68°30' West 2837.5 feet
to the quarter Section line; thence North 280
feet more or less to the Northwest corner of the
Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of
said Section 34; thence East 160 rods; thence
South 80 rods to the point of beginning.
Section 35: The North half of the Northwest quarter; Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter; also
beginning at the Northeast corner of the Southeast
quarter of the Northwest quarter of said Section
35 and running thence South 45° West 1866.7 feet
to the Southwest corner of the Southeast quarter
of the Northwest quarter of said Section 35; thence
North 1320 feet; thence East 1320 feet to point
of beginning.
TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 24 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN
Section 19: Lots 3 and 4; East half of Southwest quarter; Southwest quarter of Northeast quarter.
Section 30: Lot 1.
together with all water rights, grazing rights, winter and summer
grazing rights and improvements and appurtenances and rights of
way thereunto belonging.
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Coal Mine Basin
The following described real property (surface rights
only) located in Uintah County, State of Utah:
Lot 10 and West 1/2 South West 1/4 of Section 2, Township 4
South, Range 20 East of Salt Lake Meridian.
Allen Property
The following described property located in Uintah
County, State of Utah:
Beginning 53.5. rds. North of South East corner Section 18,
Township 4 South, Range 21 East Salt Lake Meridian thence
West 31 rds. North 61.5 rds. East 31.68 feet South 2752 rds.
East 29.08 rds. South 33.98 rds. to beginning.
Beginning 53.5 rds. North and 31 rds. West of South East
corner Section 18, Township 4 South, Range 21 East of Salt
Lake Meridian; thence West 16 rds. North 10°18' West 276.71
feet; thence West 827 ft.; South 28°20' West 172.6 ft.; South
48°05' West 363 ft. South 61°27' West 236.4 ft. thence
North 87°38' West 429.6 ft. thence North 1233.4 ft. thence
East 129 rds. South 61.5 rds. to beginning.
Wild Mountain
The following described real property located in
Moffat County, State of Colorado:
South 1/2 South East 1/4 Section 7; North West 1/4 North West
1/4 Section 17 Township 7 North Range 103 West.
State Grazing Lease
Grazing lease on the following described lands located
·in Uintah County, State of Utah:
SWl/4 Section 36, Township 3 South, Range 20 East; NEl/4
NEl/4SEl/4 Section 16, Township 4 South, Range 20 East; Lot
1 NE1/4NW1/4, Lots 3, 4 SE1/4SW1/4 Section 7, Township 4
South, Range 21 East; Lots 3, 4; SW1/4NW1/4, Wl/4SW1/4 Section 13; All Section 14; All Section 15; Wl/2, Nl/2NE1/4,
Sl/2SE1/4 Section 23; Nl/2NW1/4, Wl/2NE1/4, SWl/4SWl/4,
NW1/4SE1/4, Section 24; Nl/2Nl/2, Sl/2NW1/4, SWl/2NEl/4, NW1/4SW1/4
Section 26; All Section 27, All Section 22; NWl/4NEl/4,
El/2NW1/4, Section 34, in Township 4 South, Range 20 East,
Salt Lake Meridian.
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